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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRICHARD TRANSFER, INC.,
Plaintiff and AppellantJ
-vs.w. S. HATCH CO., a Utah corporation;
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH; DONALD HACKING,
HAL S. BENNETT and DONALD T.
ADAMS, Commissioners of said
Commission,
Defend ants and Respondents.

Case No.
10761

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and respondent, W. S. Hatch Co., (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Hatch") agrees with
plaintiff's statement of facts with two exceptions. Prichard
states "no new evidence was tendered or received" at the
August 16 hearing. While it is true that no reporter was
present, evidence was introduced by both parties as to
the results of their efforts to work together in an attempt
lo reduce operating costs and correspondingly reduce rates
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pursuant to the Commision's order of July 6, 1966. Such
fact was affirmatively found by the Commission in its
order of August 25, 1966 ( R. 119) .
As part of its statement of facts, appellant concludes
"Prichard's evidence demonstrates that the diversion of
this sulphuric acid haul will require it to close down its
~1oab terminal and will adversely affect its operations"
(p. 7). Hatch denies that the granting of the application
will have any such results. This matter will be developed
in the argument under point VI.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
HATCH ADEQUATELY PROVED THAT PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRE '
THE GRANTING OF THE APPLICATION.
POINT II
THE EXISTING SERVICE OF PRICHARD IS
NOT ADEQUATE.
POINT III
ECONOMIES TO THE SHIPPER ARE A PROPER ELEMENT OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND.
NECESSITY.
Prichard's brief contains nine points. Argument of
these points is broken down into three categories. Po~nts
I II III and IV are covered in the first category; pomts
VI and VII in the second; and points VIII and IX in

V,
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the third. Respondent's points I, II and III are in answer
to appellant's first grouping. Point IV is in answer to appellant's points V, VI and VII and respondent's points
V and VI are in answer to appellant's points VIII and
IX.
The first portion of appellant's arguments presents but
a single question to the court. Is the Commission compelled by law to protect Prichard's monopolistic one-way
haul at an annual cost to the shipping public of $68,500.00?
Prichard has a complete monopoly on the authority
to transport sulphuric acid from Mexican Hat to Moab
(R. 62, 63).
This court has repeatedly held that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission if there is
sufficient evidence to support the Commission's findings.
Rudy v. Public Service Commission, et al, 1 Utah 2d 223,
265 P. 2d 400, Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission,
101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298, Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, et al, 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.
2d 590. Therefore, unless the Commission is compelled
by law to protect the one-way service of Prichard under
the circumstances existing in this case, the Commission's
order must be affirmed.
Section 54-6-5, U.C.A. provides in part
"Before granting a certificate to a common ~otor
carrier the Commission shall take into consideration **'*** the existing transportation facilities in
the territory proposed to be served".
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The statute does not provide, as appellant contends,
that the existing monopoly must be protected regardless
of the consequences to the public. In the case of Union
Pacific Railroad Company, et al v. Public Service Commiission, et al, 103 Utah 459, 135 P. 2d 915, this Court,
in construing the above quoted statute, held:
"The discretionary power granted the Commission
by the act, to grant or withhold certificates, negatives the idea that it was intended to grant and
maintain a monopoly in any field. The fact that
the act provides that the Commission may grant a
certificate when it determines that public convenience and necessity requires such services recognizes that regulated competition is as much within
the provisions of the act as is regulated monopoly.
In the exercise of its powers to grant or withhold
certificate of convenience and necessity, questions ,
of impairment of vested or property rights cannot
very well arise. No one can have a vested right to
be free from competition, to have a monopoly
against the public."
In Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, et
al, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P. 2d 1061, this Court held:
"The Public Service Commission is charged with
the duty of seeing that the public receives the most
efficient and economical service possible. This re·
quires consideration of all aspects of the public's
interest. ***** and existing carriers, although ren·
dering good service, may not be sufficient for the
existing business or its potential."

An examination of the service provided by Prichard
will show that it does not adequately or satisfactorily
serve the shipper's reasonable needs.
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The supporting shipper requested Hatch to file this
appplication with the Public Service Commission authorizing the northbound movement of sulphuric acid and
also requested Prichard to file an application with the
Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing transportation of sulphur southbound from the rail head near
Potash to Mexican Hat (R. 32, 33). This was done in
order to have two carriers available to provide an efficient
operation in place of the inefficient, cumbersome and expensive service being provided by the same two carriers
on separate one-way movements at the present time. The
new rate was discussed with both Prichard and Hatch
(R. 40) . Prichard himself had quoted the new sulphuric
acid rate of $2.90 a ton which could thus be put into
effect, compared to the present rate of $5.60 (R. 63, 64).
Prichard admitted that he couldn't reduce the existing
$5.60 per ton rate to anywhere near $2.90 without authority to perform a two-way haul ( R. 64). Nevertheless,
Prichard refused to file an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to transport
sulphur southbound ( R. 63). Having had full opportunity to obtain authority which would enable him to provide
a parallel and sufficient service with that proposed by
Hatch and having refused such opportunity, he now
takes the position that the shipper must use his inefficient one-way service regardless of the economic consequences.
We admit that under ordinary circumstances rates are
not a proper subject of inquiry in an application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. This is for
the obvious reason that shippers would support the application of any carrier who would promise a lower rate
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regardless of the adequacy of the existing service. Howe:er, this case presents an unusual situation as was recogmzed by the Commission in its August 25, 1966 order (R.

119):

"W~ile the applicant Hatch provide satisfactory
service on the southbound transportation of molten
sulphur and the protestant Prichard provides satisfactory transportation on the northbound movement of sulphuric acid, there is no existing service
available which can be performed by one carrier
in the same vehicle which is necessary to effect the
economies herein mentioned" ( R. 118) .

The present transportation cost to the Atlas Mineral
Corporation using the inefficient services of both Hatch
and Prichard is $159,720 annually (R. 39) which can be
reduced by 43 percent, or $68,500 per year, if this application is granted ( R. 43). Certainly the "consideration of '
existing transportation facilities" required by the statute
does not compel the Commission to perpetuate such an
enormous inefficiency. Furthermore, the shipper testified
that if an efficient and adequate two-way service could
not be provided for him he would be forced to buy his
own equipment and perform both services in private car·
riage ( R. 43). Here we have a situation in which the
supporting shipper does not want to be in the transpor·
tation business (R. 43) and for that reason requested both
Prichard and Hatch to provide an efficient and economic
service which it desperately needs in order to enable it
to continue to use common carriers.
The cost of the two inefficient one-way hauls is so high
that continued use thereof is prohibited. Prichard refusfrl
to attempt to provide an efficient two-way service and
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preferred to sit back and prevent Hatch from providing
such service in the hope that he can somehow force the
shipper to continue to waste $68,500 a year. Of course,
his attempts will be unsuccessful. Even if the Hatch application is denied, he will lose the haul to the private
transportation of the shipper. In such event Hatch would,
of course, also lose the southbound sulphur haul. Certainly it is not sound economic regulation for the Commission to force a shipper to enter private carriage against
his will and take business away from two common carriers, one of whom is attempting to provide an efficient
and economic service.
We take offense to appellant's charge that Hatch is
"chiseling" rates to get new business. The proposed rates
were discussed with both Hatch and Prichard by the shipper and Prichard was given equal opportunity to obtain
two-way authority.
The services provided by Prichard are not satisfactory.
The Commission cannot in the exercise of its functions
put on "blinders" and look at mere segments of the overall
service proposed. It must look at the entire transportation problem and see that common carriers do provide, to
the best of their ability, a sound, economic and adequate
service.
The fact that the continued well-being of existing carriers is taken into account does not mean that once a
carrier is granted a franchise it acquires an inviolable and
exclusive right to render a public service merely because
it meets its own standard of adequacy. See Lake shore Molor Coach Lines v. Welling, et al, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.
'Yrl 1011.
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POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE FULLY JUSTIFIES THE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF AUGUST 25, 1966.
In the second portion of its argument the appellant
contends that the Commission acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in reversing its order of July 12, 1966
based upon what it chooses to call "a round table discussion".
The Commission's initial order of July 12, 1966 was
by its very terms a conditional order. The Commission
denied the application and ordered:
"That W. S. Hatch Co. and Prichard Transfer,
Inc. jointly and in combination, make and employ
every legal means of reducing operating costs and
correspondingly reduce the rates on the transportation of molten sulphur from Potash to Mexican
Hat, and sulphuric acid from Mexican Hat to
Moab, as those movements and transportation
services are set out and described in the findings
in this case, and that these carriers report to the
Commission on their accomplishments in this re·
gard" (R. 109, 110).
There can be no question about the conditional na·
ture of the order inasmuch as both parties were ordered
to report back to the Commission after attempting to work
out a joint arrangement whereby the rates could be re·
duced.
Hatch filed a timely petition for rehearing (R. 112)
pursuant to which the Commission gave notice of oral
argument and in said notice specifically provided that the
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hearing was for the purpose of having the parties report
on their joint efforts. The hearing notice provided, in
part:
"The purpose of the hearing to which this notice
applies is to allow the W. S. Hatch Co. and Prichard Transfer, Inc. to report to the Commission on
the results of their joint efforts to attempt to reduce operating costs and correspondingly reduce
the rates above-mentioned; to hear argument on
the W. S. Hatch Co. petition for rehearing and
reconsideration, and to give the parties an opportunity to introduce additional evidence, if they desire" (R. 114).
Hearing pursuant to said notice was had on July 12, 1966.
There was no "round table discussion" as indicated by
appellant. Both the appellant and respondent through
their respective counsel agreed that it would be unnecessary to have a reporter. However, evidence was introduced by both parties concerning their attempt to reduce
rates on a joint basis and both parties advised the Commission that although they had made every effort in good
faith to effect such economies it could not be done in the
absence of additional operating authority.
Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, sets
forth the mechanical procedure for an appeal. It provides
m part:
"No cause of action arising out of any order or
decision of the Commission shall accrue in any
court to any corporation or person unless .sue? corporation or person shall ha"'.e made application. to
the Commission for a reheanng before the effective
date of such order or decision,*****. If, after such
rehearing and consideration of all the facts in-
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eluding those arising since the making of the order
or decision, the Commission shall be of the opinion
that the original order or decision or any part
thereof, is in any respect unjust and unwarranted
or should be changed, the Commission may abrogate, change or modify the same."
The statute does not provide for a trial de novo. It
merely provides the machinery by which a dissatisfied
party may urge the Commission to reconsider its actions
and sets forth the procedural steps necessary to effect an
appeal to this Court.
At the rehearing the parties did introduce evidence
as found by the Commission in its order of August 25 (R.
118) as to their inability to make a joint rate reduction.
Based upon this report and upon the arguments presented
by counsel the Commission reversed its conditional order
of July 12. Such action is fully supported and justified by '
the evidence.
POINT V
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DENY·
ING PRICHARD'S PETITION FOR REHEARING.
POINT VI
GRANTING OF THE HATCH APPLICATION
WILL NOT RESULT IN A DIVERSION OF TRAF· ·
FIC FROM PRICHARD.
Appellant apparently lays great stress on the fact t~at
the Commission reversed its prior order. There is nothmg
unusual about this. However, in the instant case it was
not a reversal as such because the original order of July
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12, 1966 was conditioned upon the ability of the carriers
to work together. After finding that they could not, the
Commission under the circumstances then confronting it,
granted the Hatch application and subsequently denied
Prichard's petition for rehearing.
Prichard contends that the granting of the application
will result in the wrongful diversion of traffic which it
now enjoys and will consequently have an adverse affect
upon its operations.
As heretofore stated, the evidence is uncontroverted
that if an efficient two-way service such as that proposed
by Hatch is not made available to the shipper it will take
all the traffic involved from both Prichard and Hatch and
perform the service in its ovvn equipment (R. 43). Therefore, the action of the Commission has no bearing whatever upon Prichard's ability to retain the traffic. The existing rates are not realistic and Prichard will lose the traffic
for this reason even if the application is denied.
The Commission properly granted the application and
thereby provided the shipper an economic and efficient
service which it does not have at the present time. This is
the only action the Commission could take to keep the
traftic under regulation and allow certificated common
carriers to perform the service under its watchful eye and
jurisdiction, rather than blindly deny the application and
have the traffic move to private carriage.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Hatch respectfully submits that the orckr of the Public Service Commission is fully justified by
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the evidence. In no other way can an efficient and economic transportation service be made available to the
shipping public.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK K. BOYLE
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent
W. S. Hatch Co.
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
Public Service Commission

